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DEFENSE COST APPORTIONMENT AND REIMBURSEMENT
AMONG INSURERS
In 1961, the California Supreme Court decided Continental Cas-
ualty Company v. Zurich Insurance Company.1 The case involved a
controversy among three insurers over liability for an injury to the
driver of a lumber truck, incurred while the truck was being loaded.
Although the truck was insured by Zurich Insurance Company, the
lumber company by General Insurance Company, and the inde-
pendent logger who had hired the truck by Continental Casualty
Company, only Continental defended the suit and discharged the re-
sulting adverse judgment. Subsequently, Continental brought this
declaratory relief action to determine the respective liabilities of the
three insurers for the amount of the judgment and the costs of the
defense. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the
Zurich policy, covering the truck, provided primary insurance cover-
age and that the General and Continental policies provided excess
coverage. Accordingly, Zurich was liable for the loss to the extent of
the limits of its policy, while the other two insurers were liable for
the excess. The supreme court also held that all three insurers were
liable for the defense costs on a pro rata2 basis. It is to the issues of
the apportionment and reimbursement 3 of defense costs among in-
surers that this note is directed.
Basis of California Defense Cost Apportionment
Prior to 1961
Before the Continental v. Zurich decision, there was a division of
authority in California with respect to defense cost apportionment
among two or more insurers covering the same loss. Some courts
prorated the defense costs among such insurers.4 Other California
courts treated the defense obligation of an insurer as a personal duty
1 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455, 17 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1961).
2 To prorate is to distribute or divide proportionately. BLAcK's LAw
DIcTIoNARY 1385 (4th ed. 1951).
3 "Reimbursement" is used in this note only in the sense of restoration
or making whole, BLAcK's LAW DICTiONARY 1452 (4th ed. 1951), and not in the
sense of the direct right of a surety against his principal in the law of surety-
ship.
4 Oil Base Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 453, 469,
299 P.2d 952, 963 (1956). However, these apportionments were neither dis-
cussed nor justified. See Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co.,
167 Cal. App. 2d 369, 334 P.2d 658 (1959) (lower court apportioned defense
costs among insurers; held affirmed with no discussion of this apportion-
ment).
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to the insured.5 The courts following this latter line of authority
refused to permit an insurer to be reimbursed for the discharge of a
personal obligation 6 and, therefore, also denied apportionment of de-
fense costs even though one insurer had defended a claim alone for
which two or more other insurers were liable.
7
1961: Continental v. Zurich
This divergence of authority was recognized and settled by the
California Supreme Court in Continental v. Zurich. The court
expressly rejected those cases that denied recovery of defense costs
because the duty to defend was a personal obligation,8 and instead
prorated the defense costs among the three carriers. 9
In reaching its decision, the supreme court relied on the doctrine
of equitable subrogation. It noted that in California an insured was
entitled to repayment for defense costs incurred in a lawsuit that his
insurer had wrongfully refused to defend.10 From that proposition
5 E.g., Financial Indem. Co. v. Colonial Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 207,
281 P.2d 883 (1955): "[T]he agreement to defend is not only completely
independent of and severable from the indemnity provisions of the policy, but
is completely different. Indemnity contemplates merely the payment of
money. The agreement to defend contemplates the rendering of services."
Id. at 211, 281 P.2d at 885. Columbia S. Chem. Corp. v. Manufacturers &
Wholesalers Indem Exch., 190 Cal. App. 2d 194, 11 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1961):
"Neither [insurer] is excused to any extent from its full duty to defend
regardless of what course is taken by the other, so that the duty to defend is
entirely personal to each particular insurer. It has no legal power to divide
its obligation with the other, nor compel contribution from the other." Id. at
205, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
6 A further justification for nonreimbursement was that the nonde-
fending insurers were held liable for adverse judgments even though they
had relinquished all control over the defense. See Columbia S. Chem. Corp.
v. Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 190 Cal. App. 2d 194, 204, 11
Cal. Rptr. 762, 768 (1961).
7 Pacific Indem. Co. v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 190 Cal. App. 2d
293, 12 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1961); Columbia S. Chem. Corp. v. Manufacturers &
Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 190 Cal. App. 2d 194, 11 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1961);
Financial Indem. Co. v. Colonial Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 207, 281 P.2d 883
(1955); see United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Church, 107 F. Supp. 683
(N.D. Cal. 1952).
8 57 Cal. 2d 27, 38, 366 P.2d 455, 462, 17 Cal. Rptr. 12, 19 (1961). The
Court expressly disapproved Pacific Indem. Co. v. California State Auto. Ass'n,
190 Cal. App. 2d 293, 12 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1961); Columbia S. Chem. Corp. v.
Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 190 Cal. App. 2d 194, 11 Cal. Rptr.
762 (1961); and Financial Indem. Co. v. Colonial Ins. Co., 132 Cal. App. 2d 207,
281 P.2d 883 (1955).
9 The court stated: "[A]ny services contemplated by the agreement
to defend are not personal in the sense that the services of any specifically
named individual would be personal." 57 Cal. 2d at 37, 366 P.2d at 461, 17
Cal. Rptr. at 18.
10 57 Cal. 2d at 37-38, 366 P.2d at 461-62, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 18-19, quoting
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the court reasoned that an insurer that deliberately breached its
defense obligation should not be permitted to profit at the expense of
either the insured or another insurer that had faithfully discharged
its obligation."
Under general principles of equitable subrogation... it is our view
that all obligated carriers who had refused to defend should be re-
quired to share in costs of the insured's defense, whether such costs
were originally paid by the insured himself or by fewer than all of
the carriers. A contrary result would simply provide a premium or
offer a possible windfall for the insurer who refuses to defend, and
thus, by leaving the insured to his own resources, enjoys a chance that
the costs of defense will be provided by some other insurer at no
expense to the company which declines to carry out its contractual
commitments. 12
Since Continental v. Zurich, the subrogation theory has been
utilized extensively by insurers in California to obtain reimburse-
ment of defense costs.13 Consequently it is essential that the concept
itself be considered.
Equitable Subrogation
Although the doctrine of subrogation was at first strictly limited
by the courts of equity to suretyship situations, 14 its application has
been extended to include every instance in which one party, not act-
ing as a volunteer,15 "pays a debt for which another is primarily
Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 528, 310 P.2d 961 (1957),
aff'g, 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955).
11 57 Cal. 2d at 38, 366 P.2d at 461, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
12 Id.
'3 E.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 249 Cal. App.
2d 144, 57 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1967).
14 Estate of Kemmerrer, 114 Cal. App. 2d 810, 814, 251 P.2d 345, 347
(1952). It should be noted that the remedy of subrogation is unavailable in
California in suretyshij situations. When a surety discharges an obligation,
he may not be subrogated to the rights of the creditor against the principal.
This is due to the judicial construction of section 1473 of the Civil Code,
which reads: "Full performance of an obligation, by the party whose duty it
is to perform it, or by any other person on his behalf, and with his assent if
accepted by the creditor, extinguishes it." CAL. Civ. CODE § 1473. The Cal-
ifornia courts have construed this statute to mean that payment by a surety
extinguishes the obligation, so that there are no rights to which the surety
has an action for reimbursement directly against the principal. Yule v. Bishop,
133 Cal. 574, 62 P. 68 (1901); Berrington v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 130,
52 Cal. Rptr. 772 (1966); Johnson v. Mortgage Guar. Co., 117 Cal. App. 416,
4 P.2d 208 (1931). But see Sanders v. Magili, 9 Cal. 2d 145, 150, 70 P.2d 159,
161-62 (1937); Union Bank v. Gradsky, 265 A.C.A. 48, 53, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68
(1968). This construction of section 1473 has been limited to suretyship cases
and, although the language of the statute is broad, the California courts have
not extended their interpretation of it to indemnity situations. Therefore, in
California, the traditional rules of subrogation are applicable to indemnity
situations.
15 "Volunteer" is defined as "[o]ne who intrudes himself into a matter
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answerable, and which, in equity and good conscience, should have
been discharged by the latter."' 6  Essentially, its application entails
the substitution of the subrogee 17 to the rights of the person to whom
the debt or duty had been owed in order to provide a means by which
the subrogee might obtain reimbursement' 8 from the party pri-
marily liable.' 9 But before the remedy can be applied, two important
conditions must be met.
20
One condition which must be fulfilled is that the party seeking
reimbursement must not be a volunteer.21 Instead, the party must
which does not concern him, or one who pays the debt of another without
request, when he is not legally or morally bound to do so, and when he has
no interest to protect in making such payment." BLAcK's LAw DICTiONARY
1747 (4th ed. 1951).
16 Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114, 118, 228 P. 11, 12-13 (1924);
see Randall v. Duff, 107 Cal. 33, 35, 40 P. 20 (1895); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins.
Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 369, 376, 334 P.2d 658, 662 (1959);
Grant v. deOtte, 122 Cal. App. 2d 724, 728, 265 P.2d 952, 955 (1954); Estate of
Kemmerrer, 114 Cal. App. 2d 810, 814, 251 P.2d 345, 347 (1952); Fireman's
Fund Indem. Co. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 93 Cal. App. 2d 408, 412-13,
209 P.2d 55, 58 (1949).
17 A "subrogee" is defined as "one who succeeds to the rights of an-
other by subrogation." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNAnY 1596 (4th ed. 1951).
18 Randall v. Duff, 107 Cal. 33, 35, 40 P. 20 (1895): "[Subrogation] is
allowed when justice requires it, and the securities which a person so obtains
are held by him merely to insure reimbursement. He will not be permitted
to make a speculation out of it."
19 See Finnell v. Finnell, 159 Cal. 535, 540, 114 P. 820, 822 (1911);
Brown v. Rouse, 125 Cal. 645, 650, 58 P. 267, 269 (1899); Redington v. Corn-
well, 90 Cal. 49, 58, 27 P. 40, 42 (1891); Eckman v. Arnold Taxi Co., 64 Cal.
App. 2d 229, 234, 148 P.2d 677, 679 (1944).
20 It is recognized that the California courts generally prescribe five
prerequisites for a proper application of subrogation. They are: "(1) Pay-
ment must have been made by the subrogee to protect his own interest.
(2) The subrogee must not have acted as a volunteer. (3) The debt must be
one for which the subrogee was not primarily liable. (4) The entire debt
must have been paid. (5) Subrogation must not work any injustice to the
rights of others." Grant v. deOtte, 122 Cal. App. 2d 724, 728, 265 P.2d 952, 955
(1954). For the purposes of this note the first two requirements have been
consolidated. See text accompanying notes 22-27 infra. With regard to the
fourth requirement, it is assumed that the entire defense is undertaken by the
insurer. The fifth requirement, that subrogation must not work any injustice
to the rights of others, is met in defense cost apportionment, since reimburse-
ment will not work an injustice upon an insurer that has failed to fulf its
defense obligation. See text accompanying notes 11 & 12 supra.
21 Stein v. Simpson, 37 Cal. 2d 79, 84, 230 P.2d 816, 819-20 (1951); Brown
v. Rouse, 125 Cal. 645, 651, 58 P. 267, 269-70 (1899); Guy v. Du Uprey, 16 Cal.
196, 200 (1860). In Fuller v. Harwell, 126 Cal. App. 654, 15 P.2d 562 (1932), the
plaintiff had paid a senior lien on property in the honest belief that he was a
junior lien holder. Even though it was later determined that he had no in-
terest in the property, he was nevertheless subrogated to the rights of the
senior lien holder and entitled to reimbursement. The court held that be-
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have performed a contractual duty or a duty imposed by law, or per-
formed some other obligation in order to protect his own right or
interest.22 In California, the determination of whether an insurer
has been a volunteer in providing a defense for an insured is con-
trolled by the case of Gray v. Zurich Insurance Company.23 This case
held that an insurer has a duty to defend its insured in any damage
suit where the insurance policy has reasonably led the insured to ex-
pect such a defense,24 or where the claim might potentially fall within
the policy coverage.25 Failure to fulfill the duty would make the in-
surer liable for any adverse judgment suffered by the insured.26 Ac-
cordingly, in most cases where an insurer defends its insured, it is
not acting as a volunteer, but rather is protecting its own interests.
The other important prerequisite for a valid application of sub-
rogation is that the party seeking reimbursement must be one who
has discharged an obligation for which another is primarily liable.
2 7
cause he had a reasonable and honest belief that he possessed an interest in
the property, his payment was not voluntary.
22 Employers Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d
369, 376, 334 P.2d 658, 662 (1959); Fresno Investment Co. v. Brandon, 79 Cal.
App. 387, 389, 249 P. 548, 549 (1926).
23 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966). In this case
the insured was sued in an assault action in which he claimed to have acted in
self-defense. Although he had a comprehensive personal liability contract
with Zurich, the latter refused to defend him claiming that under section 533
of the Insurance Code: "[a]n insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wil-
ful act of the insured . . . ." CAL. INS. CODE § 533. The insured was held
liable for assault. In this action for breach of the defense obligation, the
supreme court on appeal held that the purpose of the statute is to prevent
encouragement of wilful torts; an obligation to defend an insured upon the
mere accusation of an intentional tort does not encourage such conduct. In
holding the insurer liable for defense costs and the adverse judgment, the
court observed that the insurer could reserve the right to assert the noncov-
erage defense later, in which case it would not be bound by the judgment.
This was accomplished in Centennial Ins. Co. v. Miller, 264 F. Supp. 431, 436
(E.D. Cal. 1967). See generally Crocker, The Continuing Importance of Gray
v. Zurich, 43 Los ANGELES B. BuLL. 239 (1968).
24 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 271-75, 419 P.2d 168, 173-75,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 109-12 (1966); see Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 65
Cal. 2d 100, 112, 416 P.2d 801, 809, 52 Cal. Rptr. 569, 577 (1966); Steven v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 869, 377 P.2d 284, 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172,
176 (1962); Coast Mut Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co.,
14 Cal. App. 2d 225, 229, 57 P.2d 1392, 1393 (1936).
25 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 275, 419 P.2d 168, 176, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104, 112 (1966); see Columbia S. Chem. Corp. v. Manufacturers &
Wholesalers Indem. Exch., 190 Cal. App. 2d 194, 200, 11 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766
(1961); Firco, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 524, 528, 343
P.2d 311, 313-14 (1959); Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 251,
286 P.2d 1000, 1004 (1955).
26 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal 2d 263, 280, 419 P.2d 168, 179, 54
Cal. Rptr. 104, 115 (1966).
27 Kenney v. Kenney, 97 Cal. App. 2d 60, 62, 217 P.2d 151, 154 (1950);
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In particular, as to the problem under consideration, subrogation may
not be utilized legitimately to obtain reimbursement for the defense
costs of an insurer where both the defending and nondefending car-
riers shared equally the defense obligation. 28
Where these two conditions are met-that is, when one party has
discharged an obligation for which another is primarily liable, and
when that discharge was not the act of a volunteer-subrogation can
be validly employed.29 Whether it has been applied properly by the
California courts in apportioning defense costs among insurers will
be considered in the remainder of this note. But before this subject
can be approached, the basis for distributing the loss itself in such
a situation should be understood.
Basis For Apportionment of the Loss:
"Other Insurance" Clauses80
Generally speaking, most modern insurance policies contain
clauses which regulate the distribution of liability among insurers
when an insured suffers a loss which is within the coverage of more
than one insurance policy;8 1 these provisions are commonly referred
to as "other insurance" clauses. Although the procedure used by the
California courts in determining the respective liabilities of each in-
surer, through reconciliation of each policy's "other insurance" clause,
is not within the scope of this note, it should be recognized that there
are three basic types of "other insurance" clauses that courts might
see Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 167 Cal. App. 2d 369,
376, 334 P.2d 658, 662 (1959); Grant v. deOtte, 122 Cal. App. 2d 724, 728, 265
P.2d 952, 955 (1954).
28 Cf. In re Whitney's Estate, 124 Cal. App. 109, 11 P.2d 1107 (1932).
29 Of course in order for subrogation to be considered the liability poli-
cies must cover the same risk. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 259
A.C.A. 204, 215, 66 Cal. Rptr. 340, 347 (1968).
80 For a current discussion of the topic of conflicting "other insurance"
clauses, see Note, Conflicts Between "Other Insurance" Clauses in Automobile
Liability Insurance Policies, 20 HASTINGs L.J. 1292 (1969). See generally
Brown & Risjord, Loading and Unloading: The Conflict Between Fortuitous
Adversaries, 29 INs. CouNsEL J. 197 (1962); Risjord, Other Insurance or The
Tortuous Channels of Litigation Involving the Conflict Between Fortuitous
Adversaries, 29 INs. CouNsEL J. 612 (1962); Russ, The Double Insurance Prob-
lem-A Proposal, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 183 (1961); Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-
Multiple Coverage, 40 DENVER L. CENTER J. 259 (1963); Comment, "Other
Insurance" Clauses Conflict, 5 STAN. L. REv. 147 (1952); Note, Concurrent
Coverage in Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 319 (1965);
Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect of Double Coverage and "Other
Insurance" Clauses, 38 IV[Nm. L. REv. 838 (1954); Note, Effect of Conflicting
"Other Insurance" Clauses, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 564 (1966); Note, Automobile
Liability Insurance in Double Coverage and the Effect of the "Other Insur-
ance" Clauses, 1 W LAmETTE L.J. 485 (1961); 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 157 (1958).
31 E.g., General Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d 419, 422, 51
Cal. Rptr. 462, 465 (1966).
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be called upon to construe: (1) pro rata clauses3 2 that attempt to
apportion the loss with other valid and collectible insurance; (2) ex-
cess clauses33 that attempt to provide coverage only after the liability
of other valid and collectible insurance has been exhausted; 34 and
(3) escape clauses 5 that attempt to avoid all liability when other
valid and collectible insurance covers the loss.36 Of course, an in-
surance policy may not contain an "other insurance" clause.
In reconciling these clauses, the California courts have arrived
at one of two results. Either they have found that one insurer is
liable on a loss to the limits of its liability as a primary insurer and
a second insurer is liable for an amount above the coverage as an
excess insurer,37 or they have found that each of the insurers bears a
proportionate amount of the liability as coinsurers.38  As they apply
to defense cost apportionment, both results will be considered.
82 A typical pro rata clause would be: "'If the insured has other insur-
ance against a loss covered by this policy the company shall not be liable
under this policy for a greater proportion of such loss than the applicable
limit of liability stated in the declaration bears to the total applicable limit of
liability of all valid and collectible insurance against such loss." Con-
tinental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 34, 366 P.2d 455, 459, 17
Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 (1961).
33 An example would be: "'[Tihe applicable insurance afforded by this
policy shall be excess over and above such other available insurance .... "
Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 34, 366 P.2d 455, 459, 17
Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 (1961).
34 An "other insurance" clause often incorporates the characteristics of
both a pro rata clause and an excess clause. E.g., Athey v. Netherlands
Ins. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 10, 11, 19 Cal. Rptr. 89, 89-90 (1962), which construed
the following "other insurance" clause: "'If the insured has other insurance
... the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater proportion
of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the declaration bears
to the total applicable limit of liability of all valid and collectible insurance
against such loss; provided, however, the insurance with respect to a tern
porary substitute automobile or non-owned automobile shall be excess in-
surance over any other valid and collectible insurance.'"
35 An escape clause was present in Air Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers'
Liab. Assurance Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 129, 130, 204 P.2d 647, 648 (1949): "'If
other valid insurance exists protecting the Insured from liability for such bod-
ily injury. . . this policy shall be null and void with respect to such specific
hazard otherwise covered, whether the Insured is specifically named in such
other policy or not .... "
386 See Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 170 Cal. App. 2d 698,
700, 339 P.2d 602, 603 (1959).
37 E.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 318,
419 P.2d 641, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic
Indemn. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d 675 (1959); Bohrn v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 226 Cal. App. 2d 497, 38 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1964).
38 E.g., General Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d 419, 51
Cal. Rptr. 462 (1966).
MVay 1969]
Apportioning Defense Costs Between Primary
and Excess Insurers 9
Apportionment When the Loss Does Not Exceed the Primary Coverage
In any case where a judgment against an insured for a loss does
not exceed the primary insurer's coverage, California courts hold that
the primary insurer alone must discharge the judgment" and pay all
expenses involved in defending the insured.41  Consequently, when
an excess insurer sustains expenses in defending an insured, the
California courts have utilized the doctrine of subrogation in securing
reimbursement for the excess insurer from the primary insurer.
42
In these cases, it is evident that subrogation is the proper vehicle
for seeking reimbursement. First, the excess insurer is obligated to
provide a defense for the insured under the doctrine of Gray v.
Zurich;43 the insurer, therefore, is not a volunteer. Second, in pro-
viding the defense, the excess insurer is performing a duty that is the
principal obligation of the primary insurer. This is because the policy
of the excess insurer does not come into effect unless the loss exceeds
the primary coverage.44  In short, both conditions precedent to a
39 Primary and excess insurance situations are most often found in cases
where a permissive user of an automobile causes damage. E.g., American
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d 675 (1959),
where the insurance policy covering the driver of a borrowed automobile in-
cluded a provision similar to that set out in note 34 supra, while the insur-
ance policy of the owner of the automobile contained a pro rata "other insur-
ance" clause. In deciding that the latter policy provided primary coverage, the
court reasoned that the excess clause in the driver's policy was effective, so
that that coverage was not "other insurance" within the meaning of the
owner's policy. Thus the pro rata clause in the owner's policy could not
be applied.
Although this approach had been criticized as being circular, depending
on which policy was read first, see Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952), the court nevertheless
held that this was the only construction that would give meaning to either
clause. The California approach to determining primary and excess insurers
is in accord with the majority. See cases collected in American Surety Co. v.
Canal Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958).
40 See cases cited note 37 supra.
41 Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 249 Cal. App. 2d
144, 57 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1967); Miller v. Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 237 Cal. App.
2d 138, 46 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1965); cf. Pacific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
239 Cal. App. 2d 346, 48 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1966).
42 See cases cited note 41 supra.
43 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966). See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra. When an insured is cov-
ered by an excess policy, it is probable that he has been led to expect such
defense, or, if the amount asked for is in excess of the policy limits of primary
coverage, the loss could potentially fall within the coverage of the excess
policy.
44 Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 249 Cal. App. 2d
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valid application of subrogation are met, and the excess insurer is
properly permitted to secure reimbursement -from the primary in-
surer.
An Inconsistent Case
Despite the reasonableness of requiring an insurer whose policy
completely covers a loss to pay all defense costs, a recent California
decision denied full reimbursement to a nonliable insurer in just such
a situation. The case, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v.
Pacific Indemnity Company,45 was a declaratory relief action con-
cerning defense costs sustained by Hartford in a prior medical mal-
practice suit. In the prior suit, the plaintiff had alleged that on June
1, 1960, the insured, a dentist, had been engaged for a course of treat-
ment that ultimately resulted in the plaintiff's damage. Hartford
alone defended the suit, since its policy covered the dentist on the
date that treatment had begun. However, during the trial it was
discovered that the injury was caused at a time subsequent to the
termination of the Hartford policy, and that at the time of the injury
the dentist was insured by Pacific. Pacific subsequently paid the
judgment but refused to reimburse Hartford for its defense expenses.
In the declaratory relief action, the court on appeal, relying on Con-
tinental v. Zurich, held that since "Hartford benefited by the defense
it interposed," the costs of the defense were to be shared equally by
both insurers.
4
This holding, rather than being in accord with Continental v.
Zurich, is at variance with it. The variance seems to be the result of
an improper application of the doctrine of subrogation. Here, Hart-
ford had borne the entire burden of defending the suit against the
insured. Although it was obligated to provide such defense under the
rule of Gray v. Zurich,47 it is nevertheless clear that between the
two companies, Pacific, which sustained ultimate liability on the judg-
ment, had the primary obligation of defense as opposed to Hartford,
whose policy had terminated before the damage was caused and which
sustained no liability whatsoever. In other words, Hartford per-
formed a duty which Pacific should have fulfilled. A proper appli-
cation of subrogation would have allowed Hartford to succeed to the
dentist's rights against Pacific insofar as necessary to secure rein-
bursement, i.e., full repayment.48  As a result of the decision, how-
144, 57 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1967): "[IT] he Aetna policy provided primary coverage
and, since the limits on the Aetna policy were higher than the amount of
the loss, the excess coverage in the Universal policy did not come into effect."
Id. at 152, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 247; see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Norwich Union Fire
Ins. Soc'y, 221 Cal. App. 2d 150, 153-54, 34 Cal. Rptr. 406, 408 (1963).
45 249 Cal. App. 2d 432, 57 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1967).
46 Id. at 437, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
47 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966). See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
48 Los Angeles County v. Frisbie, 19 Cal. 2d 634, 640, 122 P.2d 526, 530
(1942).
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ever, Hartford was only reimbursed for one half the defense costs.
Although subrogation has been denied when its application would
work an injustice upon others, 49 the courts have not allowed any
relative benefit gained by the subrogee to interfere with his right to
full repayment from a primarily obligated party.50 Thus Hartford
should have received full reimbursement for the expenses it incurred
in carrying out Pacific's defense obligation.51 By the above decision,
however, one half of Pacific's defense obligation was provided at the
expense of Hartford. This is the kind of windfall against which
Continental v. Zurich was directed.
Apportionment When the Loss Exceeds the Primary Coverage
Where the loss exceeds the coverage of the primary insurer, the
secondary insurer becomes liable for a share of both the loss and the
costs of defense.52 This was the situation and the result of Continental
v. Zurich. As will be recalled, the court there prorated the defense
costs and reimbursed Continental for its excess expenses by means of
subrogation. Unfortunately, the court did not specify whether the
defense costs were to be prorated by a ratio of the amounts paid by
each insurer on the judgment to the total judgment or by a ratio of the
applicable policy limits of each policy to the total amount of coverage
available. As a consequence of the unavailability of a definite rule to
apply, the two subsequent cases that have concerned factual situations
similar to that of Continental v. Zurich have interpreted its wording
differently. In Government Employees Insurance Company v. St. Pau*I
Fire & Marine Insurance Company5" the court held that the defense
costs should be distributed in the same ratio as each insurer's coverage
49 See note 20 supra.
50 See, e.g., Diehl v. Hanrahan, 68 Cal. App. 2d 32, 155 P.2d 853 (1945),
which involved the payment of a senior lien on certain property by a junior
lienholder. The court subrogated the junior lienholder to the senior lien-
holder's right against the principal, even though the court observed that from
a practical standpoint, the junior lienholder benefited by such payment. Id.
at 37, 155 P.2d at 856.
51 Cf. RESTATEmENT OF REsT=uiox § 80, Comment b (1937): "A person
who becomes a surety upon an obligation with the consent or because of the
fault of the principal obligor is entitled to reimbursement for all expenses
reasonably incurred by him in connection with the obligation. This right is
not necessarily based upon the benefit conferred; it is not primarily based
upon unjust enrichment but results from the comnission of a tort or the
breach of a relational or contractual duty. . . . [T]he right to reimburse-
ment includes the expenses of suits in connection with the obligation to the
extent that such expenses are reasonable .... "
52 Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455,
17 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1961); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 186, 52 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1966); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, 221 Cal. App. 2d 150, 153, 34 Cal. Rptr.
406, 407-08 (1963).
53 243 Cal. App. 2d 186, 52 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1966).
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bore to the total coverage available; conversely, in Travelers Insur-
ance Company v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society,5 4 the court
held that if the loss exceeded the primary coverage, the defense
costs would be apportioned by the same ratio as that by which the
insurers satisfied the judgment. 55 It still remains to be determined
which of these results represents the proper method of apportioning
the defense costs.56
The Manner of Apportioning Defense Costs Between Primary
and Excess Insurers in Other States
Outside California, the law concerning defense cost apportion-
ment and reimbursement between primary and excess insurers is
subject to the same split of authority as existed in California prior to
Continental v. Zurich.57 That is, some jurisdictions apply subrogation
in securing reimbursement to excess insurers,58 whereas others-those
that consider the duty to defend a personal obligation-do not apply
subrogation. 59
However, there is another distinct line of authority regarding
distribution of defense costs between primary and excess insurers.
Two states hold that if the plaintiff asks for an amount which is below
54 221 Cal. App. 2d 150, 34 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1963).
55 Id. at 153, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
56 The conclusion of this note will be that neither point of view is
correct and that where the loss exceeds the policy limits of primary cover-
age, the doctrine of subrogation is an inappropriate remedy for the securing
of distribution of defense costs among the insurers. See text accompanying
notes 99-110 infra.
57 See text accompanying notes 4-7 supra. For a discussion of the
significance of Continental v. Zurich, see Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-
Multiple Coverage, 40 DENVER L. CENERs J. 259, 269 (1963).
58 American Sur. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 258 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1958);
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 228 F. Supp. 896
(D. Md. 1964); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds,
34 Ill. 2d 424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Marquette Cas. Co.,
143 So. 2d 249 (La. 1962); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Foundation Re-
serve Ins. Co., 78 N.M. 359, 431 P.2d 737 (1967); Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 27 App. Div. 2d 932, 278 NY.S.2d 787 (1967); General Accident Assur-
ance Corp. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 2 Ohio App. 2d 234, 207 N.E.2d 670
(1965); National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group,
14 Utah 2d 89, 377 P.2d 786 (1963).
69 See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866 (8th
Cir. 1966) (Nebraska); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins.
Co., 285 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1960) (Oklahoma); American Fidelity & Cas. Co.
v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 280 F.2d 453, 459-
60 (5th Cir. 1960) (Georgia); Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
94 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1938) (Pennsylvania) (the leading case for this position);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. American Family Ins. Group, 199 Kan. 373, 429 P.2d 931
(1967); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
269 N.C. 358, 363, 152 S.E.2d 513, 518 (1967) (semble); Westchester Fire Ins. Co.
v. Rhoades, 405 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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the primary insurer's policy limit, the primary insurer pays all defense
costs. But if the plaintiff pleads damages which amount to more
than the primary insurer's policy limit, the primary and excess in-
surers share the defense costs equally.
60
It is submitted that the pleadings of the plaintiff are an unreliable
gauge for determining defense cost distribution between primary and
excess insurers. A plaintiff is often unsure as to the amount of
damages to which he is entitled; frequently a plaintiff will ask for
more compensation than his damages warrant in order to increase his
chances of obtaining a substantial settlement.61 By using pleadings
as a standard for apportioning defense costs, if the plaintiff prays
for an amount in excess of the primary insurer's coverage, the excess
insurer will be required to pay one-half the defense costs even though
it is not liable on the loss because the actual damages do not exceed
the primary insurer's liabflity.62 Fortunately, this would not be the
result in California.
The procedure in California, as various declaratory relief actions
have held,63 is to require the primary insurer to defend the insured in
the first instance. If, after the suit has been decided or settled, the
amount of liability is more than the primary coverage, the primary
carrier may recover a proportionate share of its defense expenses from
the excess insurers.64 As such, it would seem that the California
approach of basing defense cost liability upon the final judgment or
settlement is a more stable and desirable basis for determining de-
fense cost distribution than is an approach based upon the uncertain-
ties of the plaintiff's pleadings.
Apportioning Defense Costs Among Coinsurers
Coinsurers, or concurrent insurers, insure the same risk at the
same time, but on such terms that the insurers bear proportionately
60 American Universal Ins. Co. v. Dykhouse, 219 F. Supp. 62, 69 (N.D.
Iowa 1963) (applying South Dakota law); Eicher v. Universal Underwriters,
250 Minn. 7, 83 N.W.2d 895 (1957).
61 Cf. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 276, 419 P.2d 168, 176,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 112 (1966): "[Tjhe complainant . . . drafts his complaint
in the broadest terms; he may very well stretch the action which lies in
only nonintentional conduct to the dramatic complaint that alleges inten-
tional misconduct. In light of the likely overstatement of the complaint and
of the plasticity of modern pleading, we should hardly designate the thirdT
party as the arbiter of the policy's coverage."
62 Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co., 249 Cal. App.
2d 432, 57 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1967), illustrates the hazards involved in placing too
much reliance on the accuracy of the plaintiff's pleadings. Hartford is dis-
cussed in the text accompanying notes 45-51 supra.
63 E.g., Pacific Indem. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 239 Cal. App. 2d 346,
48 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1966); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y,
221 Cal. App. 2d 150, 34 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1963); Industrial Indem. Co. v. Gen-
eral Ins. Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 352, 26 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1962).
64 See cases cited note 63 supra.
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any liability occurring within the coverage of both policies.65 This
proportionate sharing of liability may be the result of the presence
of pro rata "other insurance" clauses in both policies,66 but it is
more often the consequence of judicial reconciliation of conflicting
"other insurance clauses." For example, where two insurance policies
cover the same loss and both contain excess "other insurance" clauses,
the California courts prorate the liability between the two by the
ratio of their maximum coverages.6 7
Basis of Apportioning Defense Costs Among Coinsurers
Since 1961,68 the California courts have prorated the defense
costs of coinsurers in the same proportion as the liability of each is
determined for the loss itself.69 Thus, where one insurer has defended
an insured against a claim in which it and other insurers bear pro-
portionate liability, the defending insurer has the right to recover a
pro rata share of defense costs from its coinsurers;70 but, in this case,
the basis of the defending insurer's recovery is not subrogation.
In order for subrogation to be applied legitimately, one party
must discharge an obligation for which another is primarily liable.7'1
65 9 G. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAw § 37:1368 (2d ed. R. Ander-
son 1962).
66 E.g., Wasson v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 207 Cal. App. 2d 464, 467, 24
Cal. Rptr. 665, 667 (1962), overruled on other grounds, Campbell v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303, 384 P.2d 155, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963).
67 E.g., General Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d 419, 426,
51 Cal. Rptr. 462, 468 (1966). This is also the majority approach. Annot., 69
A.L.R.2d 1122, 1124 (1960). A minority of the states would divide the loss
equally in the case of two conflicting excess "other insurance" clauses. See
the cases collected in Ruan Transp. Corp. v. Truck Rentals Inc., 278 F. Supp.
692 (D. Colo. 1968).
In addition to conflicts between two excess clauses, damages are also
prorated whenever a pro rata "other insurance" clause and an escape clause
are in conflict. Air Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 91
Cal. App. 2d 129, 204 P.2d 647 (1949). Other jurisdictions have prorated a
judgment against an insured when two policies covering the risk are absent
any "other insurance" provision. E.g., Dekat v. American Auto & Fire Ins.
Co., 146 Kan. 955, 73 P.2d 1080 (1937). Other states prorate when one policy
has a pro rata clause and another is absent any "other insurance" clause.
E.g., Vrabel v. Scholler, 369 Pa. 235, 85 A.2d 858 (1952), affd, 372 Pa. 578, 94
A.2d 748 (1953). When two escape "other insurance" clauses conflict there
has been proration. E.g., Wedell v. Road Transp. & Gen. Ins. Co., [1932]
2 K.B. 563 (1931).
68 The year in which Continental v. Zurich was decided.
69 Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 247 Cal. App.
2d 451, 55 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1966); General Ins. Co. of America v. Truck Ins.
Exch, 242 Cal App 2d 419, 51 Cal Rptr. 462 (1966).
70 Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 247 Cal. App.
2d 451, 55 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1966); General Ins. Co. of America v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d 419, 51 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1966).
71 See cases cited note 27 supra.
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In coinsurance situations, it cannot be said that either insurer is pri-
marily obligated to conduct the defense of the insured. Since both
policies effectively cover the event creating liability, both are equally
obligated to provide such defense. And because the equities of each
are equal, the doctrine of subrogation is inapplicable.7 2 Instead, the
proper basis of recovery is the remedy of contribution.
Generally speaking, contribution is the right of one obligor, who
has discharged more than his fair share of a common obligation, to
recover from another, who is also liable, the portion of that discharge
which the latter ought to pay or bear.73 Hence, an important pre-
requisite for contribution is that the parties share a common bur-
den.7 4 In coinsurance situations, each insurer promises to perform
the same obligation for the insured; each contracts with the insured
to provide a full defense in a lawsuit within the policy coverage. Thus,
where both policies provide coverage for the same loss, it can be said
that the coinsurers bear the common burden of defending the lawsuit
for the insured. And when a coinsurer has discharged more than a
fair share of a common defense obligation, it has a right to contri-
bution from the other coinsurers.7 5
Another requirement which must be met for contribution to be
a proper remedy is that some positive duty must compel the obligor
to discharge more than his fair share of the common obligation.7 6 The
72 See J.G. Boswell Co. v. W.D. Felder & Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 767, 771,
230 P.2d 386, 389 (1951); in re Whitney's Estate, 124 Cal. App. 109, 11 P.2d
1107 (1932).
73 See Williams v. Riehl, 127 Cal. 365, 371-72, 59 P. 762, 765 (1899);
Woolley v. Seijo, 224 Cal. App. 2d 615, 621-22, 36 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765 (1964);
Pacific Freight Lines v. Pioneer Express Co., 39 Cal. App. 2d 609, 614, 103
P.2d 1056, 1058 (1940).
74 Weinberg Co. v. Heller, 73 Cal. App. 769, 779, 239 P. 358, 363 (1925).
75 See Pacific Freight Lines v. Pioneer Express Co., 39 Cal. App. 2d 609,
103 P.2d 1056 (1940). The plaintiff had paid the entire cost of prosecuting a
prior action. It sought contribution from others who, together with the plain-
tiff, had hired the attorneys. The court said: "'The doctrine of [contribution]
is not founded on, nor does it arise from, contract, but is founded on princi-
ples of equity and natural justice and comes from the application of principles
of equity to the condition in which the parties are found in consequence of
some of them, as between themselves, having done more than their share
in performing a common obligation .... The declaration, often made, that
contribution does not spring from contract is sometimes misapprehended; it
only means that there need not be an express contract for it .... ' ET~he
right of Contribution ... is the product or outgrowth of a contract implied
in law .... In the circumstances here considered ... plaintiff paid a
debt owed in part by defendants. As a result, and by operation of law de-
fendants became indebted to plaintiff. It is upon this debt, which the law
declares it is defendant's duty to pay, and upon the implied contract by the
terms of which defendants agree to pay, that plaintiff's action is based."
Id. at 613-14, 103 P.2d at 1058-59, quoting in part 18 C.J.S. Contribution
§2, at 3 (1939).
76 See Machado v. Fernandez, 74 Cal. 362, 363, 16 P.2d 19, 20 (1887); Was-
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courts say 77 that because of this requirement if a coinsurer pays
more than its fair share of a loss, it is not entitled to contribution
from the other coinsurers.78  The rationale is that coinsurers have
not agreed to insure the loss completely; they have only agreed to
bear a specific proportion of it. And, so the rationale goes, since
they cannot be forced to pay any amount above that proportionate
share, any excess payment is strictly voluntary, for which no contri-
bution may be granted.79
The rule against contribution among coinsurers for an insured
loss has no application, however, in the area of defense cost recovery. 80
The basis for refusing contribution among coinsurers for a loss is that
they have agreed to insure only a proportionate share of a loss, so
that any payment above that share is voluntary;8' this cannot be
said of their obligations to defend the insured. Although coinsurers
prorate their liability through "other insurance" clauses, these
clauses are not directed to prescribing any proportionate sharing of
defense costs among other insurers.8 2 Rather, in each insurer's policy,
the insurer promises to provide a full defense for the insured. This
son v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 207 Cal. App. 2d 464, 470, 24 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669
(1962), overruled on other grounds, Campbell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 60 Cal. 2d
303, 384 P.2d 155, 32 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1963).
77 It would seem that the true reason for denying contribution for the
loss in a coinsurance situation is that the requirement of a common obligation
is lacking, due to the fact that the insurers agree to cover only a proportion-
ate share of the loss. See text accompanying notes 74 & 75 supra. However,
the courts say that they deny contribution because payment of more than its
proportionate share of a loss by a coinsurer is voluntary. This cannot be
denied since there is no duty compelling the coinsurer to make such pay-
ment. See note 15 supra. But the absence of the duty results from the
fact that there is no common obligation. Thus the basic reason for not al-
lowing contribution for the loss in coinsurance situations is really the absence
of a common burden.
78 Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 1,
100 P.2d 364 (1940).
79 Id. at 6, 100 P.2d 364, 366-67 (1940). However this rule against
contribution is subject to the exception that contribution is allowed if the
excess payment is made pursuant to an agreement among the coinsurers that
later rights of recovery will not be prejudiced thereby. Gillies v. Michigan
Millers: Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 98 Cal. App. 2d 743, 221 P.2d 272 (1950).
80 See Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 247 Cal.
App. 2d 451, 55 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1966), in which the plaintiff had settled a claim
while it was unaware of the existence of the defendant's policy. The court
allowed contribution for the settlement and defense costs. It was held that
the rule in Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d
1, 100 P.2d 364 (1940), was not applicable; the court reasoned that Continental
v. Zurich was directed against windfalls for nondefending insurers, and to
refuse contribution here would be to allow the defendant a windfall.
81 Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 1,
6, 100 P.2d 364, 366-67 (1940).
82 See notes 32-35 supra.
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promise is independent of the contract to indemnify and is not con-
trolled by any proration agreement.8 3 The result is that the duty to
provide a full defense for the insured is a common burden assumed
by the coinsurers. 4  When it is determined that one insurer, as a
result of fulfilling its positive duty to defend the insured, has sus-
tained more than its fair share of the costs, it should be entitled to
contribution from those with the same obligation. 5
Coinsurer's Fair Share of Defense Costs
Since 1961, California courts have considered each coinsurer's
fair share of the defense costs to be identical with its proportionate
share of the basic liability. 6 In other words, the fair share of de-
fense costs to be borne by each coinsurer is determined by multiplying
the total defense costs by the ratio of that coinsurer's liability cover-
age to the total amount of coverage available.
87
83 Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966); see Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455,
17 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1961): "The facts that the agreement to defend the insured
may be severable from the general indemnity provisions, and that each in-
surer independently owes that duty to its insured, constitute no excuse for
any insurer's failure to perform .... " Id. at 37, 366 P.2d at 461, 17 Cal. Rptr.
at 18. In St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Huitt, 336 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1964), the
court stated: "The obligation to defend is separate and distinct from the
duty to provide coverage and to pay .... This is a contractual right of the
insured irrespective of primary and excess coverage .... The controversy
between two insurance carriers who have no contractual relationship to each
other cannot operate to alter the obligation that each owes unto the insured,
with whom they each have a contract." Id. at 44.
84 Cf. Pacific Freight Lines v. Pioneer Express Co., 39 Cal. App. 2d 609,
103 P.2d 1056 (1940).
85 See Williams v. Riehi, 127 Cal. 365, 371-72, 59 P. 762, 765 (1889);
Woolley v. Seijo, 224 Cal. App. 2d 615, 621-23, 36 Cal. Rptr. 762, 765 (1964);
Murchison v. Murchison, 219 Cal. App. 2d 600, 604-05, 33 Cal. Rptr. 285,
287-88 (1963); Jackson v. Lacy, 37 Cal. App. 2d 551, 559, 100 P.2d 313, 317
(1940); Pacific Freight Lines v. Pioneer Express Co., 39 Cal. App. 2d 609,
614, 103 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1940).
86 Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 247 Cal. App.
2d 451, 55 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1966); General Ins. Co. of America v. Truck Ins.
Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d 419, 51 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1966).
87 Here it makes no difference whether the defense costs are appor-
tioned on the basis of the ratio by which the insurers satisfy the judgment, or
the proportion each policy coverage bears to the total amount of coverage
available; the resulting apportionment of defense costs is the same in either
case. This is contrasted with the cases discussed in the text accompanying
notes 54 & 55 supra regarding primary and excess insurers. In Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 186,
52 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1966), -the court allowed the plaintiff to recover one-sixth
of its defense costs, using the ratio of the coverages as the correct standard.
Had the court prorated the defense costs in the same proportion as that in
which the judgment was satisfied, the plaintiff would have recovered five-
twentyfirsts (5/21) of the total defense costs it incurred.
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This method of determining each coinsurer's fair share of the de-
fense costs is not unique. Many states that have decided this ques-
tion are in accord with California in allowing contribution for defense
costs among coinsurers in the same proportion as the amount of the
judgment paid by each.8 s
However, there is another approach that has recently been
adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company v. General Mutual Insurance Company,
8 9
and constitutes an example of a minority position on this question.
The case involved a reconciliation of two conflicting excess "other
insurance" clauses; although the liability of the loss was prorated in
the California manner, the costs of defense were not so prorated.
Instead, they were divided equally between the two insurers. The
court said that since each insurer assumed the same obligation to
defend, each should bear the same share of the cost of defense.9 0
This result is justified by simply considering the defense obli-
gation as a common burden of the coinsurers, independent of their
indemnity obligations.91 Once this rationale is accepted, the usual
rules of contribution distribute the expenses of defense equally among
the coinsurers. 92
88 Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 209
F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1954) (Kentucky); Oregon Auto Ins. Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952) (Oregon); Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 232 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mont. 1964);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 164 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), aff'd per curiam, 264 F.2d 671 (1959); United Services Auto. Ass'n v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 220 Tenn. 120, 414 S.W.2d 836 (1967); Case
v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 105 N.H. 422, 201 A.2d 897 (1964).
Of course, those states which view the duty to defend as a personal obli-
gation would completely deny recovery of defense costs in coinsurance situa-
tions. See cases cited note 59 supra.
89 282 Ala. 212, 210 So. 2d 688 (1968). With regard to defense costs, this
case follows the view set forth in Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental
Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 554, 147 A.2d 529 (1959). In this latter case the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that where two excess "other insurance" clauses conflict,
the insurers stand on an equal footing so that both the liability and the de-
fense costs are to be divided equally between the insurers. The Alabama
court expressly rejected the view that the insurers stood on an equal footing
with regard to the liability for the loss but did adopt the view that the
defense costs should be equally apportioned. The New Jersey approach has
been followed in other cases. Ruan Transp. Corp. v. Truck Rentals Inc. 278
F. Supp. 692 (D. Colo. 1968); Continental Cas. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co. 84
Ill. App. 2d 200 228 N.E.2d 141 (1967).
90 282 Ala. 212, 220, 210 So. 2d 688, 695 (1968).
91 See cases cited note 82 supra
92 See Taylor v. Reynolds, 53 Cal. 686, 688 (1879) ("[W]hen two persons
are subject to a common burden, it shall be borne equally between them .... ");
Chipman v. Morrill, 20 Cal. 131, 136 (1862) ("[W]here there is a common lia-
bility, equality of burden is equity .... "); Murchison v. Murchison, 219 Cal.
App. 2d 600, 604, 33 Cal. Rptr. 285, 287 (1963).
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Should California Adopt the Minority Standard?
The primary appeal of the minority position is that it is in accord
with the laws of contribution. Because the function of "other insur-
ance" clauses is to determine the distribution of the amount of lia-
bility for the loss among coinsurers, these clauses should have no
bearing on ascertaining the fair share of defense costs to be borne by
each. 3 These insurers have contracted to provide a full defense for
the insured against claims within the policy coverage, and where the
loss of the insured falls within the coverage of each policy, the duty
to defend becomes an obligation common to each coinsurer. Since
one rule of contribution is that where parties assume a common bur-
den they should bear equally the expenses incurred in its discharge,94
the minority practice of dividing defense costs equally among the co-
insurers is more in accord with the laws of contribution than is the
California method of prorating these costs.
This minority viewpoint is further strengthened when possible
justifications for the California approach are scrutinized. First, al-
though the California method of distributing the defense costs in the
same proportion as the amount of basic liability was distributed is
convenient, it is no more so than the minority approach of distrib-
uting the costs equally among the coinsurers. Secondly, it may be
argued that since the coinsurer with the greatest limits of coverage
receives the most in premiums, it should bear the greatest percentage
of defense expenses. This is also illusory. A slight increase in insur-
ance premiums produces a highly disproportionate increase in the lia-
bility coverage; the relative amounts of premiums received by the in-
surers cannot provide any meaningful support for California's prac-
tice of dividing defense costs among coinsurers by the same proportion
as the liability for the loss. 5
In short, when the duty to defend is regarded as being independ-
ent of the contract to indemnify, as is done both in California9 6 and in
the states adopting the minority view,97 there is little reason for dis-
tributing the defense costs in the same way in which the liability is
apportioned. On the contrary, an application of the usual rules of
contribution would seem to demand that the coinsurers share the de-
fense costs equally.
9 8
Should Continental v. Zurich be Modified?
Although the method of dividing defense costs equally among
insurers has never been applied to a primary excess insurance situ-
93 See notes 32-35 supra.
94 See cases cited note 92 supra.
95 See Ruan Transp. Corp. v. Truck Rentals Inc., 278 F. Supp. 692, 696
(D. Colo. 1968).
96 See cases cited note 83 supra.
97 See note 89 & text accompanying notes 91-92 supra.
98 See cases cited note 92 supra.
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ation, it easily could be so applied.9 9 It has already been noted that
the California courts use subrogation to secure defense cost reim-
bursement for an excess insurer when the amount of loss does not
exceed the amount of primary coverage.10 0 The utilization of subro-
gation here is legitimate, since the excess insurer has sustained de-
fense costs in the performance of a duty that is the principal obligation
of the primary insurer. Conversely, contribution would be an inap-
propriate remedy, since there is no common burden present between
the insurers. That is, the defense obligation does not become a com-
mon burden until both policies effectively cover the loss; 101 when
only the primary policy provides such coverage, the excess policy is
not in effect.
02
This reasoning does not apply in cases like Continental v. Zurich,
where the amount of loss exceeds the policy limits of primary cover-
age. On the contrary, an application of subrogation in this instance
would seem to ignore two of its prerequisites. First, the doctrine of
subrogation is applied only in order to secure reimbursement and not
to obtain a proration of costs. 103 But more importantly, once the loss
exceeds the primary coverage and the excess insurance policy takes
effect, it is impossible to say that the primary insurer has the principal
defense obligation. Instead, since both policies provide coverage for
the loss, it must be said that both carriers share the common obli-
gation of defending the insured.10 4 As such, constribution rather than
subrogation should be the proper remedy for the excess insurer.
But contribution calls for a different defense cost distribution
than either construction given to Continental v. Zurich. As noted
previously, California courts interpreted Continental v. Zurich to
mean that defense costs are to be prorated either in the same manner
00 But see American Sur. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274
Minn. 81, 142 N.W.2d 304 (1966). In this case the primary insurer alone had
defended the insured in a lawsuit in which the loss was below the policy limits
of the primary coverage. The court denied recovery to the primary insurer
for any amount of its defense costs, saying: "Had the recovery exceeded the
limitations of plaintiff's policy, defendant then would become equally liable
with plaintiff for the expenses incurred in defending it." Id. at 84, 142 N.W.
2d at 306.
100 See cases cited note 41 supra.
101 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, 221 Cal. App.
2d 150, 153-54, 34 Cal. Rptr. 406, 408 (1963).
102 See note 44 supra.
103 See note 18 supra.
104 The amount of the liability for the insured's loss that each insurer
pays is controlled by the insurer's status as primary or excess insurer, which
in turn is determined by the respective "other insurance" clauses in its policy.
See note 39 supra. But the function of these clauses is solely to govern the
distribution of liability for the loss. See notes 32-35 supra. The result is
that when each policy is in effect, it carries with it the obligation to provide
the insured with a complete defense.
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as the liability is paid'0 5 or on the ratio of the respective coverages to
the total insurance coverage available.1 6 Neither interpretation is
in accord with the rules of contribution. Contribution requires that
the costs of performing a common obligation be divided equally.'07
Consequently, it is submitted that where the loss exceeds the primary
insurer's coverage, defense costs should be distributed equally among
the insurers, rather than on any other basis.
It might be argued that this would lead to inequitable results,
e.g., an excess insurer might sustain only a $1000 liability on a $101,000
judgment and yet be forced to pay $10,000 in defense costs. Indeed,
such a result would seem unjust if the duty to defend were con-
sidered inseparable from the duty to indemnify. However, the duty
to defend is a separate obligation' 8 which becomes the common bur-
den of each insurer whose policy covers the loss.109 Consequently,
considerations of policy limits or judgment payments are not germane
to any distribution of defense costs. And since the duty to defend
is a common burden of the primary and excess insurers and is not
controlled by any proration agreement,1 0 under the usual rules of
contribution the costs of carrying out the defense should be shared
equally.
Conclusion
Since the California courts regard the duty to defend as being
independent of the duty to indemnify,"' no reason is apparent for
allowing the apportionment of liability for the loss to control the
apportionment of defense costs. On the contrary, when two insurers
have a common defense obligation, there is reason to require that
the defense costs be divided equally among the insurers regardless of
the manner in which the basic loss is apportioned. Such reasoning
has its foundation in the doctrine of contribution, which provides
that the costs of common obligation are to be borne equally by the
parties sharing the common burden."12 Thus when a common de-
fense burden arises among insurers-as when there is coinsurance,"
8
or when there is primary and excess insurance and the loss exceeds
the primary coverage"14-- the loss should be equally distributed
among the insurers. Therefore it is submitted that the minority
105 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, 221 Cal. App. 2d
150, 153, 34 Cal. Rptr. 406, 407-08 (1963).
106 Government Employees Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.Co.,
243 Cal. App. 2d 186, 52 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1966).
107 See cases cited note 92 supra.
108 See cases cited note 83 supra.
109 See text accompanying note 104 supra.
110 See note 104 supra.
I1 See cases cited note 83 supra.
112 See cases cited note 92 supra.
113 See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
114 See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
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position be adopted in California, since it is more in harmony with
the laws of contribution than is the present approach to defense cost
distribution.
Robert C. Gebhardt*
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